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Levin: Wrongful Death and Florida's "10-20" Liability Policy—"The Twilig
NOTES

An added note of caution was sounded in the case last discussed.
It prescribed that prosecutors must prepare their cases so that the
evidence offered as to other crimes will not be disproportionate to
the evidence offered as to the charged offense.
How appreciably different the new rule of admissibility is from
the old exclusionary rule is not immediately discernible. Perhaps
the difference is only a matter of labels. Nevertheless the manner in
which such evidence should be offered, the disposition of it by the
trial judge, and the tests to be applied by him are now relatively clear.
This in itself is an improvement.
ROBERT B. STAATS

WRONGFUL

DEATH AND FLORIDA'S "10-20" LIABILITY
POLICY -"THE TWILIGHT ZONE"

Florida's financial responsibility laws' authorize what is commonly
known as a "10-20" automobile liability policy. Attorneys have uniformly assumed that the insurance company's liability under such a
policy extends only to $10,000 for all actions that arise as a result
of death of one person. This note directs attention to the possibility
of an attack upon the entire policy limit of $20,000 through the use
of Florida's wrongful death acts and the rules of construction of insurance contracts.
The majority of casualty insurance companies licensed to do business in Florida employ the following phraseology in the liability
2
sections of their respective policies:
"To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured
shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of:
"A. bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury,' sustained
by any person ...

.

The policies further provide:
Clause I. "The limit of bodily injury liability stated in
the declarations [$10,000] applicable to 'each person' is the
,,FLA. STAT. §§324.011-.271 (1959).
2Letter from J. Edwin Larson, State of Florida Treasurer and Insurance Corn-
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limit of the company's liability for all damages, including
damages for care and loss of services, arising out of bodily injury sustained by one person as the result of any one occurrence ....

Clause II. "[T]he limit of such liability stated in the declarations [$20,000] as applicable to 'each occurrence' is, subject to the above provision respecting each person, the total
limit of the company's liability for all such damages arising out
of bodily injury sustained by two or more persons as the result
of any one occurrence."
An examination of these clauses discloses ambiguities with respect
to Florida's wrongful death of minors statute; 3 no interpretation has
been given by the courts, however.
Florida is one of four states that recognize damages for the mental
pain and suffering of the parents in an action for the wrongful death
of a minor.4 The customary procedure is for the father to bring suit
claiming damages for the mental pain and suffering of himself and
his wife.5 In addition thereto, the administrator of the child's estate
-if it is feasible to set up an estate -may bring suit for survival6
and/or loss of the decedent's probable prospective estate.7 Assuming
that the cumulative amount of both verdicts is in excess of $10,000,
the insurance company under present practices will maintain that its
liability limit is only $10,000, to be split pro rata between the father
and the administrator.
To maintain an attack upon the remaining $10,000 it is necessary
for the father to establish that mental pain and suffering is a bodily
injury within the wording of the insurance policy. There are at least
two grounds upon which a court could find in favor of this contention.
First, casualty insurance companies in Florida have, in the past, consistently indemnified their policy holders against liability for mental
missioner, to author, Oct. 30, 1959. (Emphasis added.)
3FLA. STAT.

§768.03 (1959).

4La., Va., and W. Va. have interpreted their wrongful death statutes to include
damages for mental pain and suffering. Aymond v. Western Union Telegraph Co.,
151 La. 184, 91 So. 671 (1922); R. F. Trant, Inc. v. Upton, 159 Va. 355, 165 S.E.

404 (1932); Black v. Peerless Elite Laundry Co., 113 IW.Va. 828, 169 S.E. 447 (1933).
5Miami Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Tinsley, 121 Fla. 774, 164 So. 528 (1935); Alpert,
Florida Death Acts, 10 U. FLA. L. REv. 153, 169 (1957).
6FLA. STAT. §45.11 (1959).
7Miami Dairy Farms, Inc. v. Tinsley, 115 Fla. 650, 155 So. 850 (1934); see Alpert,
supra note 5, at 170.
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pain and suffering by satisfying claims under the wrongful death of
minors statute. Therefore, denial of liability by an insurance company
could possibly be estopped. Secondly, the words bodily injury as
used in the liability policy connote sickness in addition to any physical
injuries. Although Florida has not defined sickness, it has been considered elsewhere to be any condition of the body that interferes with
usual avocations.8 At least one court has held the term to connote
mental pain. 9 On the supposition that Florida courts will adhere to
this general meaning of "sickness," it is certainly feasible that mental
pain and suffering for the loss of a child could properly be included
within this definition.
The claimant father must also establish that mental pain and
suffering is not contemplated by the liability policy wording "the
company's liability for all damages, including damages for care and
loss of service arising out of the [death of one person is $10,000]."
Damages for mental pain and suffering arise from the death of the
child, but they are not damages for care and loss of services. It is
therefore necessary to use contracts rules of construction to determine
whether the words including damages for care and loss of services
limit the scope of "all damages" to damages for care and loss of services.
Florida, using the doctrine of ejusdem generis, has held that the
effect of the words or for any other reason following specified reasons
in a contract is to restrict the operation of the clause to those specified reasons only.' 0 Therefore it is arguable that "all damages . . .
arising out of the [death]" are to be restricted to damages for care
and loss of service. By use of the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius the same result obtains." The inclusion in Clause I of the
specific damages for care and loss of services arising out of the death
of the child means exclusion of all other damages. All damages would
be implied if no specific damages were expressed. By utilization of
either doctrine, damages for mental pain and suffering, since they are
not damages for care or loss of services, are not contemplated by
Clause I as an injury arising out of the child's death. Furthermore,
mental pain and suffering, as a bodily injury -sickness -to the
parents rather than damages for care or loss of services, could be consNorthwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wiggins, 15 F.2d 646 (9th Cir. 1926).
oTexas & P. Ry. v. Barnvell, 133 S.W. 527 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910).
loMann v. Thompson, 100 So. 2d 634 (Ist D.CA. Fla. 1958). See also deMfarigny v. deMarigny, 43 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1949).
"Pope v. State, 94 Fla. 254, 113 So. 629 (1927).
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templated by Clause II of the liability section to the same extent
as a bodily injury received by any other person in the accident that
killed the child: "[Tlhe total limit of the company's liability for ...
bodily injury sustained by two . . . persons as the result of any one
occurrence [shall be up to 510,000.00 for each]."
In support of this result, the following rules of construction of
insurance contracts will be helpful: (1) An automobile liability insurance policy is to be construed against the insurer; 2 (2) when "two
interpretations equally fair may be given, that which gives the greater
13
indemnity will prevail."'
Damages for the wrongful death of an adult include care and loss
1
of support but exclude the beneficiaries' mental pain and suffering. 4
Consequently, the argument in support of dual recovery for the wrongful death of a minor is not applicable in the case of an adult. However, the quoted liability sections are by no means the only phraseology used by casualty insurance companies. Careful reading of other
policies may disclose other ambiguous wording to which the liberal
rules of construction may be applied.
CONCLUSION

Will the Supreme Court of Florida accept the foregoing interpretation of the insurance contract? In Malone v. Costa 5 the Court
granted relief by adhibiting to such reasoning. The insurance policy
in question limited to $1,000 the amount recoverable for personal
injuries to one person in any accident and to $2,000 for those received by more than one person. The plaintiff-wife obtained
a $500 verdict for injuries received while a passenger in the defendant's car. The plaintiff-husband gained a $1,000 verdict for loss of
consortium. The Court held that loss of consortium was a personal
injury to the husband separate and distinct from the injuries suffered
by the wife, saying that the phrases bodily injury and personal injury
are not synonymous and that "personal injuries do not necessarily
mean or involve the element of personal contact."' 6 Seemingly, the
Florida Court could find by similar reasoning that mental pain and
suffering is a sickness and therefore a bodily injury within the in4175 (1st ed. 1929).
"3Elliott v. Belt Automobile Ass'n, 87 Fla. 545, 549, 100 So. 797, 798 (1924).
14Florida Cent. & P. R.R. v. Foxworth, 41 Fla. 1, 25 So. 338 (1899).
15151 Fla. 144, 9 So. 2d 275 (1942).
IrId. at 149, 9 So. 2d at 277.
12See 5 COUCH, INSURANCE LAw
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